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4  Time matters: the impact of 
‘temporariness’ on the functioning 
and performance of organizations
René M. Bakker and 
Martyna Janowicz-Panjaitan
Live neither in the past nor in the future, but let each day’s work absorb your 
entire energies, and satisfy your widest ambition.
– Sir William Osler, to his students
INTRODUCTION
In increasing numbers, fi rms are setting up temporary organizations 
(TOs), to reach strategic and operational goals and to keep up with the fast 
pace of change in the technological and market environment (see Brady 
and Davies, 2004). Examples of these inter- or intra-organizational TOs 
may include sports event organizers, trial juries, cockpit crews, movie sets, 
construction projects and theatre groups among others (Bechky, 2006; 
Meyerson et al., 1996; Miles, 1964).
TOs1 have been variously defi ned as ‘a set of diversely skilled people 
working together on a complex task over a limited time period’ (Goodman 
and Goodman, 1976, p. 494), as systems ‘limited in duration and member-
ship, in which people come together, interact, create something, and then 
disband’ (Morley and Silver, 1977, p. 59) and as ‘structures of limited 
 duration that operate within and between permanent organizations’ 
(Keith, 1978, p. 195). TOs are often projected as a new and promising 
form for economic action (Grabher, 2002; Sydow et al., 2004) and as ideal 
loci of learning and innovation (Brady and Davies, 2004; Ibert, 2004). 
Moreover, TOs have become commonplace in many and diverse indus-
tries (Chapter 2, this volume) and are a focus of a nascent fi eld of scientifi c 
study.
In order for TOs to be considered a truly unique organizational form 
warranting systematic scientifi c inquiry, there needs to be an element 
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exclusive to TOs that distinguishes them from other organizational forms. 
Based on a review of extant literature, Janowicz-Panjaitan, Bakker and 
Kenis (Chapter 2, this volume), identifi ed temporariness as the crucial, 
unique characteristic of TOs. They defi ned temporariness as the fi nite time 
limit on the existence of TOs (for instance in the form of a deadline), which 
has been defi ned at, or prior to, the TO’s formation. They concluded that 
the implications of temporariness for a TO’s functioning, performance 
and link to the wider organizational context are currently lacking in the 
literature. There is thus room for theory development linking elements of 
time to TOs. This theory development should move beyond the discussion 
of temporal phases in TOs and beyond normative counsel on how to best 
pace projects.
It is for these reasons that we start from the premise that to truly under-
stand temporary organizations, one needs to consider the role of tempo-
rariness and its eff ects. Consequently, our goal in this chapter is twofold. 
First, we aim to explore the phenomenon of time and temporariness in 
TOs in depth. Second, we will formulate propositions concerning the eff ect 
of temporariness versus non-temporariness on TO functioning and out-
comes. In so doing, this chapter echoes the recent call for bestowing upon 
time and temporality a more prominent place in organization studies (see 
Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988; George and Jones, 2000) and in research 
on TOs in particular (Chapter 2, this volume).
In this chapter we propose temporariness to be a temporal element 
which has a strong impact on the functioning and performance of organi-
zations. That time-limiting eff ects in organizations might be intriguing 
can be witnessed in research by Sutton (1987) on ‘dying organizations’, 
organizations that announce that they will cease to exist within a limited 
time. Sutton demonstrated that, contrary to management’s predictions, 
the eff ort members invested in their work, after having been made aware 
of the impending termination of the organization, remained constant in 
some instances and even increased in many others. How temporariness 
impacts organizations is the focus of this chapter.
TIME IN ORGANIZATIONS
Numerous examples illustrate the profound impact temporal matters have 
on our (organizational) lives. The annual spring shift to daylight saving 
time has been shown to result in an average increase in traffi  c accidents 
of approximately 8 per cent (Grekin and Coren, 1996), and the nuclear 
catastrophe at Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez oil spill have been linked 
to, amongst others, disrupted circadian rhythms (Mitler et al., 1988). A 
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particularly salient example of how temporal matters can impact our lives 
is quoted in Labianca et al. (2005, p. 677) and concerns scientists working 
on Mars Rovers at the Jet Propulsion Lab, who work Martian days, which 
are 37 minutes longer than earth days. Although a 37 minute diff erence in 
day length may seem a minor adjustment, Jet Propulsion Lab scientists 
suff ered from severe jetlag-like complaints within just days of working on 
the project, which eventually necessitated a change in the programming of 
the scientists’ working week.
In Western culture, clock time has come to be the dominant perspective 
on time. This dominant view of time (also referred to as ‘natural’, ‘objec-
tive’, ‘even’ or ‘chronological’ time) is characterized by the assumption that 
time is independent from mankind and relates to ‘Newtonian assumptions 
of time as abstract, absolute, unitary, invariant, linear, mechanical, and 
quantitative’ (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002, p. 685). This perspective of time 
is now accepted without question and has become so fully institutionalized 
in contemporary Western society that alternative perspectives are hard to 
recognize and grasp (see Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988). This perspective 
on time should neither be taken for granted, nor obscure other, more sub-
jective, points of view. According to Mainemelis (2001), social scientists 
agree that time as an external dimension, independent of humans, does 
not exist. All of us have probably felt the sensation of time passing slowly 
at some point – when waiting for a delayed fl ight for example – or, con-
versely, of experiencing time ‘fl y’ when having fun. Flaherty (1987, p. 313) 
captures this subjectivity of time nicely by describing how clock time can 
be viewed as an externalization of the inner experience that James (1892) 
referred to as the intra-subjective ‘stream of consciousness’:
As you read these words, refl ect on the following: that in so doing, you are 
marking time. You need not consult your watch in order to accomplish this 
feat; its movements are merely externalizations of that kaleidoscopic stream of 
experience that you distil into an image of duration.
Bergson (1910) elucidated that stimuli from the environment are processed 
by our consciousness, linked to one another and experienced as inner dura-
tion, or durée. After our consciousness has created durée, it is  subsequently 
projected back to external space:
Bergson saw this process as a kind of cinematographic operation: conscious-
ness takes several snapshots of reality: it keeps a record of them by means 
of inner duration; it arranges them successively side by side to form a reel; 
and it projects the reel back to space ‘in high speed’, creating the illusion of a 
uniform linear movement that progresses through an invisible medium of ‘time’ 
. . . . Time, however, only exists in the apparatus (Mainemelis, 2001, p. 550, 
 emphasis original).
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Therefore, it should be clear that our clock does not produce time, we do.
Besides being intra-subjective, time also has an inter-subjective capacity. 
Durkheim (1912) proposed that our individual temporal experiences are 
shaped by collective rhythms in society. In fact, some degree of consensus 
on time is needed to maintain social order2 (Flaherty, 1987). The experi-
ence of time can become inter-subjective through socialization, as demon-
strated by several studies, including Bluedorn and Denhardt (1988), Hall 
and Hall (1990) and Kluckhohn (1953), which show how time perspectives 
tend to converge within, but diverge across cultures. As examples, con-
sider the diffi  culties many Northern Europeans experience doing business 
in Africa and Southern Spain when faced with the diff erent interpretations 
of deadlines and time urgency inherent to ‘Africa time’, or the ‘mañana’ 
culture sometimes ascribed to Southern Spain.
For the purposes of our discussion, we will treat time as an abstract 
notion with both intra-subjective capacity – varying in and between 
 individuals – and an inter-subjective capacity; socialization in groups 
forms and constrains our time perspectives (resulting in variation between 
groups and cultures). These notions of intra- and inter-subjective  capacities 
form the basis for our discussion of time in organizations.
A number of researchers have been calling for a more prominent 
place for the impact of time in organization studies (George and Jones, 
2000; Orlikowski and Yates, 2002). Their rationale is that although time 
is a major dimension of social organization (Zerubavel, 1979) and ‘as 
fundamental a topic as any that exists in human aff airs’ (Bluedorn and 
Denhardt, 1988, p. 316), it has yielded relatively few systematic research 
endeavors in organization and management studies, despite some notable 
exceptions (Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988; Butler, 1995; Gersick, 1988, 
1989; Hassard, 1991, 1996; Labianca et al., 2005; McGrath and Rotchford, 
1983; Perlow, 1999; Zerubavel, 1979). Moreover, studies tend to incorpo-
rate the role of time as a factor only marginally, rather than focus on it as 
key variable (Ancona and Chong, 1996).
Because contemporary Western organizations are embedded in a society 
in which an objective clock time perspective prevails, it is no surprise that, 
for organizations, clock time is the dominant time perspective on which 
they operate and the dominant view from which they are studied (George 
and Jones, 2000). Just as the dominant time perspective in organizations 
is a consequence of their embeddedness in society, ‘joining a formal work 
organization represents the fi nal stage in conditioning the individual to 
an “organized” time consciousness’ (Hassard, 1996, p. 366). Rather than 
mere recipients of a clock time preoccupied society, organizations can 
be seen as producing and reinforcing its prevalence. It so happens that 
clock time holds advantages for production systems: it both standardizes 
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a common operating framework for synchronizing activities, and com-
modifi es labor as a factor of production (Hassard, 1989), as epitomized in 
Frederick Taylor’s time and motion studies in 1911 (Taylor, 1911 [1967]).
There has not always been an obsession with clock time. In traditional 
economies, work systems were task oriented (Hassard, 1989). With the 
advent of industrialization however, the focus of organizations shifted 
from man to machine and effi  ciency. Mass production and speed became 
dominant and the clock became the major instrument for coordina-
tion and control, giving rise to metaphors such as ‘time is money, time 
is a limited resource, and time is a valuable commodity’ (McGrath and 
Rotchford, 1983, p. 66). Ever since this transformation, modern econo-
mies, unlike traditional ones, have been time oriented, as refl ected, among 
others, in 9 to 5 working days, 15 minute coff ee breaks, ‘overtime’ and 
two-day weekends.
Although the prevalence of clock time appears undeniable, a number 
of writers have suggested that not all organizations experience time in a 
similar fashion. For instance, the ‘plurality of social times’, as advocated 
by Hassard (1989), distinguishes between the micro-social times of groups 
and communities and the macro-social times of systems and institutions, 
because, although society runs on clock time, ‘groups and organiza-
tions may . . . have diff erent collective experiences of time’ (George and 
Jones, 2000, p. 660). In another study, Clark (1985) suggested that time 
is idiosyncratic to organizations, meaning that each organization has its 
own highly local event time, whether for the organization as a whole or 
merely for its sub-parts. Similarly, Hassard (1989) has noted the diff erence 
between management’s obsession with linear clock time and calculations 
of duration on the one hand, and the work fl oor using their knowledge 
of event cycles to produce time, on the other hand. Zerubavel (1979) has 
shown how the temporal structure of ‘private’ and ‘public’ time diff ers 
between doctors and nurses in hospitals. Finally, Lee and Liebenau (1999) 
report on fi ndings that indicate that sub-parts of organizations, profes-
sional groups and organizations can diff er in the time parameters of their 
organizational culture.
The above examples indicate the existence of what Ancona et al. (2001) 
have labeled ‘temporal zones’, both within and between organizations. In 
essence, a temporal zone can be seen as a sub-part of an organization that 
is relatively homogeneous internally, while distinct from its environment 
with respect to temporal parameters such as time horizons, time pressure, 
time perspectives, temporal norms, pace, rhythm, cycle, scheduling, pres-
sure, fl exibility, scarcity, urgency and/or autonomy (Ancona et al., 2001).
A perfect example of a temporal zone is provided by Roy (1960). In this 
study Roy showed how a diff erent interpretation of time emerged at the 
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level of groups of factory workers. In order to make it through the long 
days of tedious factory work, the group invented its own event-based 
system in which they created concepts such as ‘peach time’, ‘banana time’, 
‘window time’, ‘pick up time’ and ‘fi sh time’, each accompanied by specifi c 
role-playing interactions to punctuate the infi nitely stretching work day. 
Instead of ‘the day being endless durée it was regulated in a series of social 
activities’ (Hassard, 1996, p. 333) limiting the experienced time horizons.
Temporal zones may emerge spontaneously, as was the case with 
‘banana time’ in Roy’s study (1960), or be brought into existence inten-
tionally. With respect to the latter, Ancona and colleagues (2001) proposed 
that temporal zones in organizations are designed to achieve ‘temporal fi t’ 
with specifi c environments or task demands, ‘grouping together activities 
sharing the same temporal parameters, such as pace, time horizon and 
cycle’ (Ancona et al., 2001, p. 525) while diff erentiated with respect to 
temporal parameters in their environment.
That such diff erentiation in temporal parameters may emerge with 
regard to teams or work groups, such as temporary organizations, is sup-
ported in a number of studies. For instance, Labianca et al. (2005, p. 678) 
argue, that ‘[w]hen a team comes into existence, it establishes a temporal 
schema that diff erentiates its members’ understanding and experience of 
time and deadlines from that of others’. This is in line with Ancona and 
Chong’s contention (1996, p. 259) that ‘in an organization there might be 
a dominant temporal cycle, . . . and numerous other cycles such as team 
cycles’. This theory is supported by research that shows that teams tend 
to pace themselves in a unique way (Gersick, 1988, 1989). This fi nding has 
important implications for TOs, and Bluedorn and Denhardt (1988, p. 
304) build upon it by making it explicit that there are ‘temporal rhythms 
among various classes or groups within organizations’, and that ‘small 
groups, classes or organizations may be thought of as having temporal 
boundaries that distinguish them from others’ (Bluedorn and Denhardt, 
1988, p. 307). This is clearly the case for temporary groups.
As proposed in the introduction, we consider the temporariness of 
TOs to be their defi ning characteristic. Temporariness and the unique 
approach to time and timing that it implies render TOs temporally distinct 
from non-temporary organizations. Several authors support this conten-
tion. The concept of atemporality, as recently applied to TOs by Janowicz-
Panjaitan, Kenis and Vermeulen (Chapter 5, this volume), implies that 
temporal distinctiveness arises in TOs from their being sheltered from 
the past, present and future. This is based on the notion that, by virtue 
of their ex ante specifi ed ending point, TOs have a ‘right-bracketed’ time 
frame (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995), and therefore do not anticipate a 
future. In addition, TOs often have a clearly fi xed starting point, and in the 
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extreme, are made up of people who have never worked together before 
(Goodman and Goodman, 1976). This implies that TOs, more often than 
not are also ‘left-bracketed’, lacking a common history. This signifi es that 
‘a temporary organization is decoupled from other past, contemporary, 
or even future sequences of activities’ (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995, p. 
446). Miles (1964) refers to this shelter as creating a ‘temporal bubble’, 
which distinguishes the TO from its permanent environment, delineating 
a temporal zone. Such temporal zones may have similarities to ‘liminal 
spaces’, which are in this case, paraphrasing Turner (1977), social spaces 
betwixt and between positions arrayed by ongoing organizations (see also 
Tempest and Starkey, 2004). From a view of TOs as temporal zones, we 
will argue that TO members operating in such a liminal space will develop 
specifi c ways of functioning, with consequences for the outcomes of the 
TO as a whole.
TEMPORARINESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
FUNCTIONING OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF TOS
Thus far, we have treated temporariness as an organization-level variable. 
In fact, a number of diff erent levels of time can be distinguished, including 
an individual and an organizational level (Das, 1993) among others. These 
diff erent levels are not independent of each other; rather, they are likely to 
interact: inter-subjective, aggregated time levels shape and constrain indi-
vidual, subjective time orientations. In fact, as Das (1993) notes, the more 
interesting phenomena occur at the intersection of the diff erent temporal 
levels.
The role of the individual, while taking center stage in management 
and organization studies, is often neglected when studying temporal 
matters (Das, 1993). In this section, we will look at the implications of 
temporariness for individual members, and explore the impact that these 
micro processes have on the relationship between temporariness and per-
formance. Based on Coleman (1990), we thus attempt to understand the 
macro relationship between temporariness and performance by focusing 
on micro behavior: the behavior of TO members in an organization that is 
temporary (see Figure 4.1). Specifi cally, we propose that three phenomena 
form the micro foundation for the relation between the temporariness of 
TOs and their performance. In TOs, compared to members of non-tempo-
rary organizations, members are likely to focus more on the present than 
on the past and future (P1); members are more likely to experience time-
lessness (P2); and members will entrain less to external temporal cycles 
in the environment (P3). We argue that by considering these three micro 
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mechanisms, we can infer the infl uence that temporariness is likely to have 
on a TO’s performance. Specifi cally, we propose that temporariness is 
likely to have a positive eff ect on creative problem solving (P4) and a nega-
tive eff ect on knowledge sedimentation (P5). The performance eff ects will 
be discussed in detail in the following section.
The central argument of this section on the implications of tempo-
rariness for the functioning of individual TO members is that a temporal 
zone perspective on TOs allows us to view them as distinct forms, where 
members operate in a protective bubble, guarded from the shadow of 
the future and the burdens of the past (Miles, 1964).3 This bubble has a 
twofold eff ect on TO members. On the one hand, members are ‘apart’ 
or distinct from the rest of the organization(s) while, on the other hand, 
they are ‘together’, and, therefore, collectively share the temporary char-
acter of the TO (Miles, 1964). This twofold eff ect results in the creation 
of group boundaries, as labeled in Social Identity Theory (see Taifel and 
Turner, 1979). Viewing TOs as temporal zones, we propose that distinct 
features are likely to arise in them which have important implications for 
their functioning (see Bechky, 2006). In fact, past research has shown that 
unique practices (Scarbrough et al., 2004) and distinctive norms (Lundin 
and Söderholm, 1995) can indeed emerge in TOs.
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Figure 4.1  Eff ect of temporariness on organizational performance: micro 
foundations
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level variable, which leads to an individual-level awareness of impending 
termination among TO members (Chapter 2, this volume). Because of this 
awareness, we believe that members in TOs and those in non-temporary 
organizations perceive and deal with the past, the present and the future 
diff erently, or what Twenge et al. (2003, p. 410–411) refer to as ‘time ori-
entation’. Specifi cally, we argue that in temporary organizations, a strong 
orientation toward the present is likely to emerge among its members.
The subjectivity and malleability of its members’ time orientation is 
an important consideration in the study of time orientation in temporary 
organizations. When focusing on people’s time orientation, it should be 
noted that it is both subjective and malleable (Ebert and Prelec, 2007). 
Moreover, ‘future and past events have an impact on present behavior to 
the extent that they are actually present on the cognitive level of behavioural 
functioning’ (Nuttin, 1985, p. 54, emphasis added). We posit that TO 
members’ awareness that termination of the TO is looming, after which 
time essentially ends for the TO as well as for the individual’s member-
ship in the group, is likely to diminish the eff ect of future anticipations 
on TO members’ current behavior. It is as if from the perspective of a TO 
member, both toward the task and his/her fellow TO members, there is 
no shared future beyond the TO’s termination point. Or as Lundin et al. 
(2002, p. 136) put it, in TOs ‘the future is bounded by the project’s end’. 
One might suppose that if there is no, or very little expectancy of future 
collaboration, there may be little to no importance placed on the conse-
quences of present actions for the future, simply because the TO is unlikely 
to be in the future. Moreover, a long-term vision and long-range planning 
of activities seem counterintuitive in a temporary setting. In addition, in a 
temporary context in which members work on a clearly defi ned task that 
must be accomplished within a limited time, there is little opportunity 
for the postponement of activities. Taken together, these circumstances 
render it likely for members of a temporary group to focus less on the 
distant future and more on the present.
For reasons similar to their decoupling from the future, TOs are often 
decoupled from the past, because TOs have a clearly fi xed starting point 
and are often composed of members who have rarely or never worked 
together before (Goodman and Goodman, 1976). Therefore, TO members 
most often lack a common history. In this ‘left-bracketing’ model, the 
lack of common history prior to the starting point of the TO implies 
that its members lack a common experience and the opportunity to have 
developed trust, but equally do not have to carry any ‘burdens of the 
past’ (Miles, 1964). In fact, the time brackets imposed by the TO’s tempo-
rariness rid the TO members of a ‘shadow’ of a common past and future 
(Miles, 1964). Temporary systems, therefore, likely create a narrowed 
130 Temporary organizations
time perspective among their members: ‘the person lives more in the psy-
chological present, coping with immediate demands and simultaneously 
forgetting the past and neglecting plans for the future’ (Miles, 1964, p. 
457–458). This phenomenon of being ‘concerned . . . with the immediate 
present and the proximate future’ is the essence of a present-time orienta-
tion, also referred to as ‘closed time’ (Ancona et al., 2001, p. 524).
In summary, by creating a distinct temporal zone or bubble, TO 
members are freed from the expectancy of a common future as well as 
from the weight of a common past. Therefore, it follows that:
 Proposition 1: All things being equal, members of temporary organiza-
tions focus more on the present (rather than on the past or future) as 
compared to members of non-temporary organizations.
A stronger orientation to the present, rather than the past or future, can 
be linked to a stronger focus on the depth of experience rather than its 
sequence. Mainemelis (2001) suggests that there are two dimensions to 
the experience of time – its depth and its succession – and that a trade-
off  exists between the two. In other words, because of limited attention 
resources, ‘the more one’s consciousness focuses on succession, the less 
attention it invests in the depth of the here-and-now experience, and 
vice versa’ (Mainemelis, 2001, p. 551). The succession of time relates to 
its stream from the past to the future. In ordinary settings, members of 
organizations link each unfolding moment to the past and the future, cre-
ating a sequence. In temporary settings, although the basic mechanism is 
likely to be similar, for TO members the past and future are limited to the 
temporal brackets created by the beginning and termination point of the 
TO. Therefore, members are likely to have less opportunity, and perhaps 
less inclination to sequence or link current events to those preceding and 
following the existence of the TO. This trade-off  between depth and suc-
cession of duration, allows greater depth of experience. To counter the 
risk of sounding esoteric, consider how not worrying about the long-term 
future of one’s project frees up ‘brain space’ to focus fully on the present.
The combination of greater depth of current experience, less atten-
tion to sequencing and matching one’s sense of duration to clock time is 
likely to result in an experience of timelessness. Mainemelis (2001, p. 548) 
defi ned timelessness as ‘the experience of transcending time and one’s self 
by becoming immersed in a captivating present-moment activity’. The 
total engagement in a task that timelessness implies bears close resem-
blance to the concept of fl ow as developed by Csikszentmihalyi (1975) 
and Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre (1989). In experiencing timelessness, 
a person becomes totally immersed in the task at hand, a state which 
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‘mobilizes one’s entire attention resources and physical energy toward 
only one stimulus, which is the present-moment activity’, accompanied by 
a temporary loss of self-consciousness and sense of time (Goleman, 1997 
in Mainemelis, 2001, p. 556). As Mainemelis (2001) notes, one prominent 
way in which timelessness thus manifests itself is by individuals experienc-
ing distorted perceptions of duration. Prior research has demonstrated 
that under various circumstances, a given period of time may seem to pass 
faster or slower (Flaherty, 1987). The underlying argument for this phe-
nomenon is found in cognitive psychological models such as the cognitive 
timer model (Glicksohn, 2001; Zakay, 1989). The logic of this model is 
that attention and arousal are codependent (Kahneman, 1973). As such, 
if one activity requires more extensive attention, less attention is available 
for other tasks, both tapping into the same pool of attentional resources 
(Glicksohn, 2001). Individuals constantly – more-or-less consciously – try 
to match their produced sense of duration to a clock, by virtue of a cogni-
tive timer, and thus withdraw from the attention pool. As a consequence, 
when more attention needs to be invested in non-temporal cognitive 
processing – for instance when an individual is engaged in a stimulat-
ing task – less attention is available for the cognitive timer, resulting in 
 distorted duration perceptions (Glicksohn, 2001).
This trade-off  between attention devoted to cognitive timing and atten-
tion committed to stimulating tasks is similar to the trade-off  between the 
depth and succession dimensions of time. When focusing on an activity 
occurring in the present moment (proposition 1), less attention is granted 
to the succession of time as recorded by the cognitive timer, and more 
attention is put into the depth of the experience, likely resulting in distorted 
perceptions of duration4 and the experience of timelessness. Moreover, 
timelessness is likely to occur when there is ‘a psychological space in which 
one can become immersed in the present-moment activity without wor-
rying about future consequences’ (Mainemelis, 2001, p. 555). By virtue 
of their temporariness, TOs draw members into the present rather than 
into the past or future. In essence then, the past and future only ‘distract 
one’s attention from the depth of the here-and-now direct experience’ 
(Mainemelis, 2001, p. 559), limiting the opportunity for the experience of 
timelessness. In other words, when not taking into account the past and 
future, members focus on the depth of the present moment, and as ‘other 
concerns fade . . . the participant often reports that he is working at the 
heights of his powers’ (Miles, 1964, p. 463).5 It follows that:
 Proposition 2: All things being equal, members of temporary organiza-
tions are more likely to experience episodes of timelessness as compared 
to members of non-temporary organizations.
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Entrainment has been defi ned as ‘the adjustment of the pace or cycle of 
one activity to match or synchronize with that of another’ (Ancona and 
Chong, 1996, p. 251). Entrainment implies that while groups or organiza-
tions have their own endogenous temporal cycles, these cycles are cap-
tured by dominant, external ‘pacers’. Working together, these captured 
cycles ‘establish an entrained rhythm that then “pulls” many other cycles 
into synchrony’ (Ancona and Chong, 1996, p. 253), increasing these 
cycles’ dominance. Just like any other temporal zone, TOs are entrained to 
the pace and cycles of their environment. However, there are reasons why 
TO members entrain relatively less with their environment than members 
of non-temporary organizations.
Ancona and Chong (1996) argued that entrainment depends on the pres-
ence of external cues in the environment as well as the system’s openness to 
those external cues. The temporariness of a system is likely to infl uence the 
system’s openness to those cues. Chong (1995) found that those teams that 
were ‘buff ered from their external environment paced themselves through 
internal mechanisms and the task at hand’, while ‘teams that were not buff -
ered from the external environment . . . exhibited entrainment to external 
rhythms’ (Ancona and Chong, 1996, p. 264). According to them (p. 270), 
organization members, groups and organizations ‘that are more open to 
their environment will be more likely to entrain to that environment than 
those with impermeable boundaries’ that buff er against entrainment.
We propose that the protective brackets of TOs that shelter them from 
the past and future are likely to act as buff ers and limit TO members’ 
concern with external cycles that stretch beyond the TO’s existence. In 
fact, some scholars have observed that members of TOs tend to display 
unique pacing procedures (Gersick, 1988; Miles, 1964) distinct from those 
observed in the permanent contexts that envelop them. Examples of this 
include Gersick’s model (1988), which shows that teams with explicit 
deadlines ‘pace themselves to temporal milestones’ (Ancona and Chong, 
1996, p. 264), suggesting that a group’s time consciousness can strongly 
diff er from that of its context.
TO members’ present-time orientation thus makes them less prone to 
the temporal parameters prevalent in their environment. This implies that 
due to their awareness of impending termination and the strong focus on 
the immediate activity that it tends to elicit, members of TOs are likely 
to pay relatively less attention to external temporal cues. Therefore, the 
extent of their entrainment is likely to be lower. Whereas non-temporary 
organizations tend to be strongly entrained to dominant cycles (Ancona 
and Chong, 1996), members of TOs are unlikely to devote much attention 
to cycles extending beyond the point of their termination. The same argu-
ment could be made with respect to the TO’s past. Thus, all things being 
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equal, by virtue of their temporariness, cycles outside the TO members’ 
system, such as culturally prevalent clock time milestones, are likely to 
have less impact on the TO’s endogenous cycles, such as members’ pace of 
work or setting intermediate deadlines, than is the case in non-temporary 
organizations. Therefore, it follows that:
 Proposition 3: All things being equal, members of temporary organiza-
tions are likely to be less entrained to cycles in the environment as com-
pared to members of non-temporary organizations.
TEMPORARINESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
PERFORMANCE OF TOS
By applying propositions 1 through 3, we will show that the ways in which 
individuals function in a TO can aff ect the performance of the whole organ-
ization. We begin this discussion with the assumption that the individual-
level processes described above aggregate to group-level outcomes (see 
Figure 4.1). More specifi cally, we argue that due to temporary organization 
members’ stronger focus on the present, higher likelihood of experienc-
ing timelessness and relatively low level of entrainment, TOs can produce 
more benefi cial outcomes than non-temporary organizations; specifi cally, 
increased output of creative solutions, a higher innovative output and supe-
rior knowledge creation. At the same time, however, temporariness may 
also make it more diffi  cult for a TO to sediment knowledge into the wider 
organizational context than is the case in non-temporary organizations.
Creative Solutions, Innovation and Knowledge Creation
Compared to non-temporary organizations, TOs provide a context in 
which creativity, innovation and knowledge creation can emerge more 
readily. First, creativity, innovation and knowledge creation in TOs are 
likely to be boosted by a present-time orientation. Increased focus on the 
present is an outcome of limited attention resources; the less attention one 
needs to invest in the succession of events and linking them to the past and 
future, the more deeply one can focus on the task at hand (Mainemelis, 
2001). As an example of this outcome, Labianca et al. (2005) found 
that ‘atypical’ deadlines, meaning deadlines that require more cognitive 
processing because of an awkward start and end time – such as 4:07 rather 
than 4:00 – result in lower performance on tasks. Labianca and colleagues 
explained this fi nding by arguing that the cognitive processing involved in 
atypical deadlines constitutes a cognitive distraction from the task to be 
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completed. A present-time orientation is thus likely to result in a surplus 
of cognitive attention available for the task at hand.
A second reason why TOs provide a context for creativity, innovation 
and knowledge creation was suggested by Mainemelis (2001, p. 548): 
‘scholars . . . have suggested over the years that the timeless intensity of 
the present moment is a gateway to creativity and joy’. More specifi cally, 
timelessness suspends two factors that are detrimental for the generation 
of novel and useful ideas: fear of failure and fear of negative judgment:
What usually kills or blocks one’s creativity is lack of courage to explore novel 
or countercultural ideas, paralyzing anxiety about one’s performance, and 
premature rejection of one’s insights as inadequate or not worthy of further 
elaboration. The loss of self-consciousness . . . prevents the arousal of such fears 
and judgments and facilitates the playful and imaginative engagement in the 
task (Mainemelis, 2001, p. 559).
In 1964 Miles (p. 455) added to this belief when he suggested that the 
 temporariness of TOs also directly alleviates the fear of experimenting.
The penalties for making mistakes are reduced. Since life in the temporary 
system ‘is not for keeps’ the participant ordinarily feels freer to experiment, 
in the knowledge that other members of the system will not be around later to 
punish his acts, should his experimentation threaten them in some way.
This statement suggests that by virtue of the timelessness experience, tem-
porariness, both directly and indirectly, lessens the creativity hampering 
fears of failure and negative judgment among TO members, leading to 
increased creativity and knowledge creation.
Finally, besides the positive consequences regarding the provision of 
order and coordination, entrainment to external pacers can have negative 
implications as well. One negative implication is that entrainment may 
hamper creativity (Ancona and Chong, 1996, p. 278). When all organiza-
tional parts or all partnering organizations are dominated by one pacer 
as a consequence of entrainment, their actions can become artifi cially 
unifi ed. This could keep them from functioning in a manner that tempo-
rally ‘fi ts’ the specifi c task and leads to optimal results. Under conditions 
of entrainment, alternative temporal scenarios are suppressed because the 
entire organization is wrenched into the same temporal cycle. Moreover, 
since entrainment refl ects repeated patterns, it emphasizes routine over 
innovation (Ancona and Chong, 1996). The eff ect of entrainment, creating 
temporal order and unity through repeating cycles and rhythms, is likely to 
lessen ‘the probability of searching for, and fi nding, creative solutions and 
new modes of operation’ (Ancona and Chong, 1996, p. 278). As we argued 
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in the previous section, because TOs are likely to be less entrained to exter-
nal pacers, they are likely to create the temporal space in which creativity 
and innovation can fl ourish. Based on these assumptions, by virtue of their 
greater present-time orientation, higher probability of timelessness and 
lower entrainment, we argue that all things being equal, temporariness of 
TOs is likely to produce higher levels of creativity and innovation com-
pared to non-temporary organizations. Consequently, we propose that:
 Proposition 4: All things being equal, temporary organizations are better 
able to develop creative solutions and create innovative output as com-
pared to non-temporary organizations.
Knowledge Sedimentation in the Non-Temporary Context
The same characteristics that render TOs appropriate vehicles for unleash-
ing creativity, innovation and knowledge creation might have negative con-
sequences for sedimenting knowledge in the wider context. Prior research 
has recognized the problems involved in sedimenting knowledge from 
organizational forms with inherently limited duration. Therefore, the chal-
lenge is to sediment knowledge in a wider organizational context before 
the TO is terminated, before its members are designated to a diff erent task 
(Grabher, 2004) or return to their parent organizations. From this perspec-
tive, the role of the TO in sedimenting knowledge is just as crucial as that of 
the parent organization’s. Scarbrough et al. (2004) have demonstrated how 
knowledge sedimentation is hindered by unique practices likely to arise in 
TOs. One example is learning boundaries, which are a result of practices 
being bound to specifi c projects. Moreover, creation and sedimentation 
of knowledge appear to hinge on diff erent logics, which lead to a trade-off  
between creating and maintaining knowledge (Grabher, 2004; Scarbrough 
et al., 2004). We argue below why TOs constitute a form of organizing espe-
cially vulnerable to knowledge dispersion and how their temporariness and 
the unique temporal phenomena it evokes, contribute to this vulnerability.
Sedimentation is related to the preservation of knowledge for use after 
the TO ceases to exist. As we have argued, long-term planning is con-
trary to the very character of TOs. Activities or goals that extend beyond 
the termination point of the TO, such as knowledge sedimentation, are 
thus likely to be of low relevance for TO members. Considering the TO 
members’ focus on the present, sedimenting knowledge outside the TO’s 
boundaries for future use is unlikely to be of immediate concern. Therefore, 
the present-time orientation that TOs are likely to promote renders the 
issues of knowledge sedimentation less relevant to TO members than for 
the members of non-temporary organizations.
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Similarly, we have argued that the experience of timelessness derived from 
the total immersion in a captivating present-time activity (Mainemelis, 2001, 
p. 548), is more likely to be experienced in a temporary setting. In the experi-
ence of timelessness, one’s entire attention and energy is directed toward the 
singular activity in which one is engaged, rendering the issue of knowledge 
sedimentation secondary. Thus, given the importance of both timelessness 
and the focus on the present in TOs, little consideration is likely to be given 
to other distracting tasks, such as the codifi cation of knowledge for sedi-
mentation. To the present-time focus of members, as well as timelessness, 
we include a third impediment to knowledge sedimentation in TOs – the low 
level of entrainment to external cycles that TOs are likely to exhibit. Lower 
entrainment implies that the TO operates according to cycles that are dis-
tinct from those in its environment, and the TO is therefore likely to be ‘out 
of sync’ with that environment. One of the frequently cited tools for assuring 
knowledge sedimentation is to embed the TO in non-temporary structures 
(Engwall, 2003; Grabher, 2004; Scarbrough et al., 2004). However, lower 
levels of entrainment mean they will be less embedded in non-temporary 
structures, reducing the likelihood of successful knowledge sedimentation. 
Ancona et al. (2001, p. 525) point out that integration and coordination 
across temporal zones that are ‘diff erentiated on the basis of conceptions 
of time and the way actors relate to time’, are highly prone to confl ict. This 
confl ict, in turn, can inhibit interactions between the temporal zones and 
thus the successful sedimentation of knowledge (Ancona et al., 2001). In 
short, the positive eff ects of a present-time orientation, episodes of timeless-
ness and lower levels of entrainment on creative problem solving, need to be 
weighed against the negative consequences for sedimenting knowledge for 
the TO as a whole. In light of the above, our fi nal proposition states:
 Proposition 5: All things being equal, temporary organizations are less 
able to successfully sediment knowledge in the wider context as compared 
to non-temporary organizations.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have developed a temporal perspective on TOs inspired 
by the unique role of time for this particular organizational form (Lundin 
and Söderholm, 1995). By proposing a temporal perspective on TOs and 
by exploring its possible implications for their functioning at the level of 
the individual and performance at the organizational level, we have con-
tended that time matters greatly for understanding this unique form of 
organization.
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With our analysis we have attempted to contribute to a deeper under-
standing of TOs by emphasizing their temporal dimension, temporari-
ness, which had been called for in prior research (Chapter 2, this volume). 
Studying this defi ning attribute of TOs will, in our view, help to legitimize 
the fi eld of TO research and place it more solidly in the mainstream of 
organization studies. Also, having begun to unpack the implications of 
temporariness for the functioning and outcomes of TOs, we have developed 
a number of propositions which will hopefully inspire future research.
In a broader context, this research furthers the idea that organiza-
tions should be viewed through a temporal lens, hopefully leading to 
more research on the impact of time on organizations, which remains 
understudied. In particular, we call for research on the temporal design of 
organizations. We could imagine an organization made up of consciously 
created temporal zones, where the diff erentiating factors are the tempo-
ral parameters rather than a specifi c product or service, as is the case in 
divisions or departments. Such an organization could be thought of as 
having fast-paced, short-cycled zones entrained to a rapidly changing 
environment and dealing with short-term goals and shorttime horizons. 
These zones could then be balanced by stable, slower-paced, long-cycled 
zones with administrative duties, entrained to the fi scal year or seasonal 
cycles (see Ancona et al., 2001). As a complementary third type of tem-
poral zone, TOs could be set up which, as was the topic of the present 
discussion, are apt vehicles to achieve non-routine or even one-off  goals 
and tasks which require creativity, innovation and knowledge creation. In 
our view, such temporal diff erentiation in organizational design could be 
a valid alternative to other forms of coordination. The study of time and 
temporality in TOs can also be linked to the emerging literature on teams 
which has recently started to explore the diff erences between teams based 
on time (see Bradley et al., 2003; Saunders and Ahuja, 2006).
Despite the importance of examining temporality in TOs, the generaliz-
ability of our theorizing and propositions to all temporary organizations 
may be limited. First, our propositions mainly pertain to TOs that involve 
full-time members. TOs whose members work part time on a project – 
and the rest of their time in the permanent organization – or TOs that 
require constant elaborate interaction with the permanent organization, 
are likely to reduce the emergence of in-group dynamics and the impact 
of temporariness on the processes described in this chapter. Similarly, our 
propositions are likely to be attenuated by the reality that some TOs are 
part of routine, continuous collaboration within or between organiza-
tions. Such TOs are made up of the same or similar groups of people over 
and over again. The same caveat can be applied to TOs that stretch over 
extremely long periods of time, more and more resembling non-temporary 
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rather than temporary systems. We think, however, that these repeated 
and infi nitely stretching projects, to some extent violate TOs’ principle 
characteristic of temporariness. In fact, as Bradley et al. (2003) have noted, 
short-term, temporary teams working together on tasks of long duration, 
develop skills and motivations usually found in ongoing, non-temporary 
teams. Nevertheless, it should be noted that our proposed eff ects are likely 
to occur mostly in pure TOs that focus on rare or ‘one-of-a-kind’ tasks to 
be accomplished within a limited time frame, with a group of people who 
share either a limited, or no future of working together. The third and 
last limitation we see in our propositions is that they are conditional on 
subsequent empirical research and that the empirical base for many of our 
propositions is sparse and has never been applied to TOs. Studying the 
propositions in this chapter would require substantial eff ort, and, because 
of their varied nature, require a diverse set of methodologies for data col-
lection and analysis. Considering the prevalence of temporary organiza-
tions and the ever-increasing need for creativity and innovation in less 
time, we believe that the payoff  would be substantial.
NOTES
1. In line with the rest of this volume, we will refer to temporary organizations as TOs 
despite the fact that this label is somewhat problematic. The term ‘organizations’ has 
many characteristics, some of which are applicable here and some that are not. In this 
chapter, TOs should rather be viewed as temporary social systems, in which people 
come together as representatives of organizations, to perform a task under the explicit 
condition that it is known from the outset that this social system will exist for a limited 
duration.
2. As is the extreme case with clock time in our contemporary society.
3. Although we readily acknowledge that this is but one possible view of TOs.
4. In fact, there is empirical evidence that there is an association between a stronger orienta-
tion towards the present and a distorted perception of duration, in which the present is 
rated to last longer than usual (Twenge et al., 2003).
5. Finally, it is worth stressing that in addition to immersion in present activity, other factors, 
such as clear goals and few distractions (Mainemelis, 2001), are considered to be conducive 
to experiences of timelessness. Both of these factors have been linked to some extent to 
TOs. However, since we do not view them as exclusive to TOs, we do not focus on them in 
our analysis. Instead, we only focus on temporariness, which is exclusive to TOs.
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